Both the Court's caseload and civil society engagement with the Court changed throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s when the ECtHR gained intermediate and extensive authority.
14 During this period, the Court, with a steady and growing docket, became the de facto Supreme Court of human rights in Europe. 15 Even though there were negative reactions to the Court's expanding jurisprudence and power-first in the United Kingdom, and then in France 16 -member states generally accepted ECtHR judgments, although compliance was sometimes partial or delayed. 17 Moreover, human rights emerged not only as a distinct area of European law but also as a broader legalpolitical field marked by contests over the meaning and interpretation of human rights as an increasingly important social and legal issue in Europe. 18 The enlargement of Europe in the late 1990s-which expanded the Convention's membership to forty-seven and its geographical reach from western Europe to the easternmost boundaries of Russia-had a major impact on the Court and its authority. Most notably, in 1998, the ECtHR was reconstituted as a permanent IC, and the European Commission on Human Rights, previously responsible for filtering applications to the Court, was disbanded. At first, these significant changes did not alter the Court's approach to adjudicating human rights cases. The supreme interpreter of the Convention, the ECtHR, initially continued to pursue the jurisprudential path developed since the late 1980s for the new eastern European member states. Yet the combined effects of the institutional transformation and the structural and systematic human rights problems in several new member states led the Court's 12. Mikael Rask Madsen, France, the UK and "Boomerang" of the Internationalization of Human Rights , in HUMAN RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON 19 The ECtHR could not diffuse its interpretation of human rights to lower courts in the same way a constitutional or national supreme court might; instead, the ECtHR was forced to serve as the final court of appeal for the protection of the individual human rights of more than 800 million Europeans. 20 With the Court increasingly overburdened and backlogged-yet still progressively expanding the scope of the Convention-a number of member states launched, for the first time since the Court's creation in 1959, a systematic critique of both the Court's power over national law and politics and the quality of the Court's judges and their judgments. 21 This discontent climaxed with the 2012 Brighton Declaration, adopted by all forty-seven member states, which began an institutionalized process that aimed to limit the ECtHR's power. 22 The process before and after the Brighton Declaration raises the fundamental question of whether the overall authority of the Court has changed. Although more exacerbated in the case of the ECtHR, the situation somewhat resembles that of the Court of Justice of the EU-another European IC created in an entirely different historical context that, like the ECtHR, also faces a problem in terms of eliciting respect for its rulings in a number of Eastern European countries. In both cases these implementation problems have in turn spurred criticism also in the original member states. 23 This article analyzes the transformations of the Court's authority by emphasizing on one hand the broader historical context of its developmentnotably changes at the geopolitical level-and, on the other hand, the institutional and constituent-specific contexts influencing the Court's authority. Because of the size of this empirical object, the analysis cannot be exhaustive and is instead based on a combination of structural analysis of the broader geopolitical context, that is, the overriding global frameworks of power, and the ideas that influence and enable actions in both ICs and in regional and national settings; more pointed case studies of important member states; and analysis of significant changes in the institutional design of the ECtHR. The focal point of 19 the analysis is the changing authority of the ECtHR as a result of both broader structural changes and country-specific interfaces with the Court. Geopolitics set the parameters for the action and reforms of the ECtHR, but the Court's specific authority-and particularly the unevenness of the Court's authority across member states-is for the most part a product of the more local politics.
Addressing the ECtHR's ever-evolving authority, part II analyzes the long Cold War period from 1950 through 1989 during which the ECtHR transitioned into a powerful international court. Part III then turns to the post-Cold War period from 1989 to the present, first analyzing the increasing number of judgments handed down by the Court, and then examining the possible new directions of the Court against the background of its recent criticism. II THE ECTHR DURING THE COLD WAR Scholars have argued that European governments embraced the Convention and the ECtHR, in part, to "lock in" liberal democratic ideals into the Western European form of government. 24 But although defending Free Europe was a key driver in the drafting of the Convention, 25 states generally assumed that the cost of ratifying the treaty was low. 26 Indeed, the original Convention provided a flimsy padlock that was easily broken: ratification did not require accepting the ECtHR's jurisdiction or the right of individual petitions, through which individuals could submit claims to European Commission of Human Rights. 27 Instead, both features, which later became trademarks of the European human rights regime, were optional at the time. The judicialization of the Convention depended, therefore, on each state's acceptance of these optional provisions. The optional nature of important parts of the agreement-introduced as a necessary compromise during negotiation of the European human rights system-deeply influenced the authority and practices of the ECtHR until the mid-1970s. 28 Only after all major member states had accepted these optional review provisions did the Court begin to acquire broader authority, analyzed below. As originally designed, European states could choose to only accept the jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial institution, the European Commission of Human Rights. 29 Under the Commission's jurisdiction, the right of individual petition was optional, and ratifying the Convention only resulted in the Commission's compulsory jurisdiction over interstate complaints. 30 Further weakening the legal dimension of the system, the recommendations of the Commission were not legally binding unless the Committee of Ministers accepted them. 31 Thus, recommendations were principally controlled by an interstate political body rather than an independent legal body. 32 The Commission, however, had the power to bring a case before the Court if the state in question had accepted the Court's jurisdiction and the case could not be settled by conciliation. 33 Individuals had no such option, whereas states could choose to refer a case to the Court if they had accepted its jurisdiction. 34 As a result of this institutional design, the Commission rather than the Court initially became the key institution in the European human rights system. By filtering applications and deciding which cases to review on the merits or refer to the ECtHR, the Commission became the central Strasbourg institution and therefore a critical player in building the system's authority. 35 In what follows, this article first analyzes the period of narrow authority ) that resulted from both institutional design and the structural limitations imposed by the Cold War and decolonization. It then addresses the subsequent period (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) in which the Court broadened its authority by laying the foundations of European human rights law and establishing itself as the region's de facto supreme court of human rights.
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A. The Fragile Human Rights System in Search of Authority Ratified by ten member states, the Convention became legally binding in 1953. 36 In 1955, a number of smaller countries-Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Iceland, and Belgium, along with the Federal Republic of Germany-accepted the provision on individual petition. 37 Germany. 38 It was the support of smaller European countries that ensured the initial establishment of the Convention's oversight system. Conversely, the two major European imperial powers, France and Britain, which together with Italy had the greatest influence on the drafting of the Convention, 39 both initially abstained from accepting the right of individual petition and the jurisdiction of the Court. Moreover, the fact that states assenting to these optional clauses typically did so only for three or five years at a time combined with the reluctance of key member states to commit to a European-level review of their human rights practices, put the entire system in a fragile situation. 40 Consequently, both the Commission and the nascent Court needed to prove themselves to reticent governments in order to secure the institutions' continuous operation.
For a new, fragile human rights system in search of authority, the first cases to reach Strasbourg were hardly ideal. Filed in 1955, the Commission's first case, Greece v. United Kingdom, 41 was an interstate dispute between two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, Greece and the United Kingdom, at the height of both the Cold War and decolonization. The issue involved the rights of Greek insurgents in Cyprus. Britain had extended the reach of the Convention to cover some of its colonial possessions, including Cyprus, yet by not accepting individual petition or the Court's jurisdiction, it was assumed by the Foreign Office that this extension was a merely symbolic gesture. 42 Greece's interstate complaint effectively bypassed this careful British evasion of the Convention system. Coming to terms with being sued by a NATO ally, the U.K. Foreign Office eventually defended its actions as a necessary response to the emergency situation on the island. The Commission resultantly investigated both the alleged violations and the emergency situation. 43 The ambiguity in what role European human rights should play, and the recognition-or lack thereof-by member states, is strikingly clear from Greece v. United Kingdom. In response to the imminent investigation by the Commission, the British Foreign Office analyzed every member of the Commission delegation. Although this assessment was only for internal use, it clearly revealed the British officials' disdain for the nascent system. Although Waldock of the United Kingdom and Professor Sørensen of Denmark both received favorable reviews as "the only members of real caliber," practically every other Commission member was regarded with scorn. 44 Italian Dominedo was described as "garrulous and rather ridiculous individual," and the French Pernot as "quite capable of supporting the British case in the morning, the Greek in the afternoon, and a compromise of his own making in the evening." 45 And then there was the question of decolonization and Cold War politics. Icelander Jonasson in particular was singled out as not only "NATO's enemy [number one]" but also as "impetuous, obstinate, and ambitious. He is, like all Icelanders, an anti-colonialist and very idealistic about anything which does not concern him or Iceland. We fear he will vote for Human Rights." 46 In practice, the Foreign Office used its intelligence to sabotage the Commission's visit to Cyprus, on numerous occasions allowing only Sørensen and a few others access to files and facilities. 47 But when British efforts seemingly failed to avoid an embarrassing showdown in Strasbourg with this cast of apparently unfriendly European jurists, the United Kingdom eventually solved the case by diplomacy. 48 In 1959, Britain gave up its colony, and no further action was called for in Strasbourg-a result viewed with some relief by all parties. 49 Also in 1959, the ECtHR was finally ready to receive cases. Mirroring the Commission's experience, the Court's became embroiled in high politics in its first dispute. The 1959 Lawless 50 case concerned the practice of detention without trial in Ireland during an IRA insurgency, a matter also of British interest. 51 The European Commission and the Court both found that the practice violated Article 5 of the ECHR. 52 Yet the Court also found that the Irish Government was acting in conformity with the Convention because, under the treaty's derogation clause, the "life of the nation" was threatened. 53 Although the outcome of the case once again pleased governments, the Court nevertheless asserted the power to decide precisely when such situations of emergency existed-a small but important step for the Court.
The Irish and Greek cases are illustrative of the legal-diplomatic nature of the Convention system at this point in time. The Court and Commission had to strike a fine balance between developing the Convention and simultaneously persuading reluctant governments of the institutions' sensitivities to complex domestic sociopolitical contexts. 54 violations in very few cases and gained the image of being minimalistic and even state-friendly in their operations. 55 Statistically, the Commission played a significant gatekeeping role; it decided whether or not to refer an individual complaint to the Court. 56 Through this structure, the Commission in part controlled the development of the Court's jurisprudence. 57 Equally important was the Commission's power to screen applications. Of the 713 individual complaints received by the Commission from July of 1955 to March of 1960, 710 were rejected. 58 During the next decade only fifty-four cases were declared admissible out of some 3,600 applications. 59 And of this small number of admitted cases, the Commission found violations of the Convention in only a handful. 60 Consequently, among potential litigants, the Commission gained a reputation for dismissing cases. 61 The situation at the Court was even more striking. During its first decade of operation, 1959 through 1969, the Court was involved only in ten cases. 62 In fact, after the Lawless and De Becker 63 cases, the Court was practically without work during the mid-1960s, which led some to question whether it should be shut down due to inactivity. 64 Only toward the end of the decade did the Court slowly start gaining renewed public and political prominence. When the governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands simultaneously filed interstate complaints for very serious violations of the Convention against the Greek colonels who had seized power in Greece, 65 the system's role as the guardian of freedom was symbolically reinstated. 66 The case received significant press coverage and ended with the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe. 67 It also showed, however, that the balance [Vol. 79: 141 between internationally legalized human rights and Cold War political objectives created divisions within the system. Although a number of smaller countries with strong democratic records used the Greek case to advocate for an idealist approach to human rights, the larger member states-notably the United Kingdom, France, and Germany-were reluctant because they feared that isolating Greece would jeopardize the Greek commitment to NATO. 68 Jurisprudential developments also surfaced behind this cloud of Cold War politics. The 1968 Belgian Linguistics 69 case was the first case in which the ECtHR found a violation of the Convention, although by a highly divided eightto-seven vote. It nevertheless signaled that a majority of the judges were ready to give Convention rights and freedoms an effet utile. 70 Considering both the number of applications as well as the diversity of applicants from states to individuals during this early period, there is little doubt that relevant legal constituencies were aware of both the Court and the Commission. Yet the European human rights system was not highly esteemed in all camps. Because of system's reluctance to admit cases or to find violations, lawyers and activists generally saw little use in going to Strasbourg. 71 The obvious spokesmen for the Convention-the part-time judges and commissioners in Strasbourg-were only haphazard advocates for the system when fulfilling their national roles. 72 Finally, the judgments of the ECtHR were so fragmented and specific that most member states and lawyers did not consider them as having an effect beyond the litigating parties-the definition of narrow authority in the model of Alter, Helfer, and Madsen's framework. 73 The system also suffered from a number of external structural limitations. First, the broader geopolitical contexts in which it operated-the Cold War and decolonization-were not conducive to establishing authority because they put key member states, notably the United Kingdom and France, in highly complex political situations. Second, the very notion of human rights law was ambiguous and was more often associated with politics than law, partly as a consequence of the linkage between international human rights and the Cold War, 74 and partly 68. In fact, the Greek junta benefited more generally from Western support, including U.S. support, as, out of a pure Cold War logic, the colonels were seen as a guarantee that the country would not move toward a neutral or pro-Soviet position. See, e.g., ALEXANDROS NAFPIOTIS, BRITAIN AND THE GREEK COLONELS: ACCOMMODATING THE JUNTA IN The Court's limited role and authority changed over the following fifteen years, rapidly metamorphosing the Court from a paper tiger to a court with real teeth and both intermediate and extensive authority. In this process, the initial minimalistic approach of the Strasbourg system paradoxically constituted an advantage. Major European powers' failure to fully accept the jurisdiction of the Court and the right of individual petition had turned the institutionalization of the ECtHR into a "game of cat and mouse" in which the Court was being dragged around by the member states. 75 Although the immediate consequence of this limited external recognition of the ECtHR was its fragility as institution and limited legal shadow, the Court's minimalistic approach to the Convention also had a positive side effect: more and more governments accepted the Court and the individual petition because they simply did not fear the Court's influence. 76 The United Kingdom did so for three years starting in 1966 based on precisely such an assessment. 77 This assessment was not unique to Britainin 1973, both Italy and Switzerland followed suit. The next year, in the aftermath of President Pompidou's sudden death and with the fading memory of the war in Algeria, France finally ratified the Convention and accepted the Court's jurisdiction, although individual petition was accepted only much later, in 1981. 78 The democratization of Greece, Portugal, and Spain also brought these countries into the ECtHR protection system in 1974, 1978, and 1979, respectively. 79 Three further exogenous factors influenced this expansion of the Court's authority. First, the originally limited space for developing the Strasbourg system was mainly due to geopolitical constraints deriving from Cold War politics as argued below. That made lawsuits between NATO allies-and corresponding denunciations of NATO countries as violators of human rightsvery damaging to the collective interest of Western Europe. By the early 1970s, however, the Cold War seemed to be in retreat; détente politics became the name of the game. Second, decolonization was virtually over by the early 1970s, at least for the larger colonial possessions, which made the international positions of France and the United Kingdom much less at risk. 80 A structural change in human rights discourse also occurred around this time, with the focus of the discourse moving from the practices of European imperial powers to other perpetrators such as military dictatorships in Latin America, the apartheid regime in South Africa, and Eastern Europe's Helsinki Process. 81 A third factor that influenced the ECtHR during this period was European integration. Whereas the initial Strasbourg jurisprudence was very case specific, after 1975, the idea of a Europe of common standards made its entrance as an additional justification for more progressive human rights developments. 82 The standards in question were, however, not the common-market ideas of the European Community but values derived from sociopolitical developments of the more permissive and less patriarchal society that was taking form in many European countries. 83 In other words, changes in geopolitics opened up a new space for developing a jurisprudence that sought to couple European human rights with intra-European societal developments.
The ECtHR's burgeoning power during this period is immediately apparent from its legal practices. The jurisprudence of the last half of the 1970s set a new tone-a dynamic championing of European human rights-that was very different from the self-constrained legal diplomacy of the previous period. In a series of landmark decisions, the Court fundamentally transformed European human rights from a project mainly linked to Cold War objectives to both an independent mission of setting common standards across Europe and a quest for a real protection of human rights under the ECHR. 84 In the late 1970s, the framework for this distinctively European protection of human rights was hammered out in three key cases: Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 85 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 86 offered ECtHR judges a chance to revisit the tricky question of national emergencies, an issue for which the Court had previously shown great deference to the member states in the Lawless case. 88 The case was a controversial interstate complaint against the United Kingdom concerning five interrogation techniques used by British security forces in Northern Ireland. 89 The Court held that these practices could not be justified by merely citing to a national emergency. 90 The Court found that the interrogation techniques in question violated the nonderogable Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment-a provision that must be respected even in situations of political unrest and violence. 91 In the same year as Irish, the ECtHR decided Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, a case concerning corporal punishment of an underage pupil. 92 The Court famously stated that the Convention was "a living instrument . . . [to] be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions . . . and commonly accepted standards in the . . . member states." 93 This set the stage for the Court's later use of a highly controversial, dynamic interpretation of the ECtHR.
The following year, in Airey v. United Kingdom, the Court further extended its reach by noting that "[t]he Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective." 94 Somewhat similar to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in its formative period, 95 the ECtHR managed to devise a tripartite framework that consisted of nonderogable rights, 96 dynamic interpretation, 97 and the requirement of an effective and practical protection of rights by the member states. 98 The decisions were not all unanimous or easily swallowed by the respondent countries, but they made a strong claim for the Court being the authoritative interpreter of the Convention.
In 1976, a pattern of growth began in the number of cases under the Court's review. Figure 110 And this perception of the ECHR was not unique to Denmark. Other states party to the Convention continued to regard the Strasbourg system as a positive but distant institution, essentially international and therefore of little domestic importance. 111 In stark contrast to Denmark, the United Kingdom became "the most regular customer in Strasbourg" throughout the 1980s. 112 Although there had been some warnings in the two interstate cases involving Cyprus 113 and Ireland, 114 as well as the individual petition cases of Golder, 115 Tyrer, 116 and Airey, 117 it was still assumed in the Foreign Office that the United Kingdom's relationship to international human rights was that of exporting legal norms rather than importing them. 118 Yet as a consequence of the ECtHR's multiple findings of U.K. violations of the Convention-twenty-two from 1975 to 1989the continuous acceptance of "the right to individual petition came up as a real question" at the highest political level. 119 time-and in sharp contrast to the current conservative British governmentthe Thatcher government's response was that "the U.K. was not to pull out, but the Court to pull back." 120 But behind the critical public rhetoric, the United Kingdom generally took consequential steps to implement lost cases in Strasbourg as well as take proactive steps to more generally comply with European human rights norms. 121 The one exception was Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 122 in which the ECtHR found that the long detention period permitted by the British Prevention of Terrorism Act violated Article 5(3). After expressing anger and sympathy for the victims of terrorism in the House of Commons, Thatcher announced that Britain would refuse to accept the judgment and would derogate from certain provisions of the Convention. 123 In more institutional terms, the British government's frequent interaction with Strasbourg had significant consequences. First, it resulted in human rights being "domesticated" and the British Home Office increasingly took over from its Foreign Office. 124 Another important consequence was that the U.K.-Strasbourg interaction triggered the development of specialized human rights lawyers in the United Kingdom, a unique situation in Europe at the time. 125 Much of this legal activism was directly linked either to the conflict in Northern Ireland or to the increasing rift between the British left and the Thatcher government regarding the protection of civil and political rights, such as the rights to strike, assemble, or protest. 126 In other words, whereas geopolitics had enabled the ECtHR to pursue a different interpretive strategy since the mid-1970s, it was domestic feuds that fueled the making of a distinct British human rights environment in the 1980s-an environment that would have influence beyond the British Isles. 127 The legal establishment, however, was initially averse to using the ECHR. As one prolific human rights barrister recalled, "It was distinctively seen as unfashionable to use the ECHR . . . even treacherous . . . one was seen as being in the last ditch or in a hopeless case if you referred to it . . . I was perceived as a maverick that had an obsession that was un-British . . . ." 128 But with the entrepreneurial efforts of a handful of key barristers, the situation was quickly reversed and these human rights lawyers went on to repeatedly secure victories against their home state in Strasbourg. 129 Unsurprisingly, roughly half of the cases against the United Kingdom during the period in focus involved specialized human rights NGOs. 130 Due to these and other developments, Britain became the frontier in which the ECtHR acquired intermediate and extensive authority. That is, the United Kingdom was the first member state in which the Court had a real, immediate, and continuous domestic importance as well as a broader audience. Although the strengthened respect for, and pursuit of, human rights in the United Kingdom had no real counterpart in other member states, it had some presence in academia on the continent, where law schools had started to integrate European human rights into the curriculum. 131 Human rights centers, most often established on the fringes of legal academia, were an additional innovation of the 1980s. In Britain, the pioneers were at Essex University, which hosted key professors and litigators of European human rights. 132 In other countries, notably in Scandinavia, well-funded human rights centers were also set up, but, in line with the general view of human rights as an "export good," they took a broader global perspective. 133 Internally focused human rights centers required more time to take root. 134 The state of human rights and ECtHR authority during this period is best labeled, due to the varied state of human rights across member states, as narrow and intermediate authority, with flashes of expansive authority. 135 There is little doubt, however, that the late 1980s ushered in a new era of broader authority for the ECtHR. This expanded authority was evident in the Court's increasingly packed docket, general impact on human rights, and ability to spur broader interest in the field. 136 Although a situation similar to the United Kingdom's increasingly intense interface with the ECtHR did not develop in other Convention member states until the 1990s, 137 After the end of the Cold War, the ECtHR started generally to deliver a significantly higher number of judgments per year. Further change occurred between the periods 1990 through 1999 and 2000 through 2014 as both the rate of applications to the Court and the Court's output expanded substantially after 2000. 139 The Court continued its trend of the 1980s until about 1999 with a steady increase in the number of judgments, from around thirty in 1991 to 177 in 1999. 140 Between 2000 and 2014, this trend accelerated. The Court issued 695 judgments in 2000 and 1,624 in 2009. 141 The number dropped to 891 rulings in 2014. 142 The drop in the annual number of judgments beginning in 2011, however, is a relative one as it is a product of change in policy at Strasbourg to join cases such that more applications are listed in a single judgment. 143 In 2013 and 2014, for example, the Court judged 3,661 and 2,388 applications but delivered only 916 and 891 judgments, respectively. 144 The year 2013 had the highest figure ever in terms of number of applications judged. Figure 3 provides the number of judgments delivered each year during the period from 1990 to 2014. The two periods (1990-1999; 2000-2014) thus created a fundamental challenge not only to the high standards set in the 1980s and 1990s but also to the Court's strategy of spinning an expansive and tighter normative web of European human rights. 147 Closely related to the challenges the massive member state intake precipitated, a major overhaul of the system's institutional design provides additional context to explain the increase in the Court's activity described in Figure 3 . With Protocol No. 11's entry into force in 1998, the ECtHR was transformed into a permanent IC with compulsory jurisdiction and compulsory right to individual petition. 148 As part of the institutional overhaul, the Commission was closed down and the supranational protection of human rights in Europe was fully judicialized. 149 Importantly, Protocol No. 11 was not simply the result of the transformation of post-Cold War Europe. 150 In fact, the negotiation was initiated in 1983 when it became apparent that the Commission had difficulties dealing with what was identified as a serious backlog of cases. 
A. Judicializing and Embedding Human Rights in Western Europe (1990-2000)
As indicated by Figure 3 above, the evolution of cases before the ECtHR in the 1990s follows a steady but limited growth pattern that began in the early 1980s. Although Britain was the main violator of European human rights and the frontier of the development of the human rights field in the 1980s, other countries led the charge during the 1990s. 152 Figure 4 lists the percentage of total output of judgments for a representative number of Western European member states. Figure 4 suggests that France, Italy, and Turkey are key countries for understanding the ECtHR's changing authority during the 1990s. Italy and Turkey, although quantitatively the most significant countries in terms of the number of judgments against them, are actually outliers. The case of France is more representative of the general transformation of the Court.
Figure 4
Year Country Italy was an outlier due to the inability of its legal and political system to respond adequately to the requirements of Article 6, which generated a huge caseload. 154 By the early 2000s, judgments against Italy-due in large part to the excessive length of Italian trials-accounted for an average of forty-five percent of the total number of judgments delivered by the Court. 155 These cases against Italy are important as it is the first time the Court had to deal with structural human rights problems. 156 Although the Italian government generally paid the damages awarded by the ECtHR, the root of the problem-the archaic legal proceedings-was not sufficiently reformed. The situation of Italy presented a new challenge for the Court, one the Court would face continuously during the following decade: that compliance was increasingly partial and judgments on particular issues seemed to lead to more, rather than fewer, cases challenging the same structural problems. Thereby the ECtHR judgments arguably generated more cases than it resolved, as the underlying structural problems were not fixed. In terms of the Court's authority, this created a paradoxical situation of increased mobilization by litigants paired with relevant state agencies' insufficient efforts to give effect to the ECtHR's rulings. As a result, the Court's intermediate and extensive authority increased while its narrow authority decreased.
The plight of democratizing countries presented another new challenge to the Court as it had to not only monitor but also promote human rights. Turkey provides an apt illustration of the ECtHR's authority in this complex context, a situation that also would become well known to the Court throughout the 2000s. Turkey had accepted individual petition and the Court only in 1987 and 1990 respectively, and cases from Turkey did not appear before the Court until the mid-1990s. 158 The pattern of cases generally reflects Turkey's distinctive social, political, and legal problems at that time. These problems included the contested status of the Kurds, which caused recurrent cases in Strasbourg, and a set of issues related to the modern Turkish state's guarantee of basic civil liberties and political freedoms. 159 In terms of the authority of the ECtHR, the cases from Southeast Turkey stood out. For the first time, in Aksoy v Turkey, the Court found a respondent state in violation of the prohibition on torture. 160 Violations of Article 3 were also found in a number of other cases involving the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. 161 Due to these and a steady stream of other human rights cases, the total number of judgments directly linked to southeast Turkey from 1996 to 2008 was approximately 175 cases, with another 1,500 pending in 2010. 162 This was the first time the Court was faced with the challenge of gross and systemic human rights violations. 163 Turkey's problematic assimilation into the ECHR system reveals two things 158 164 This suggests a linkage between the pioneering human rights constituents in Britain and the broadening of the ECtHR's authority. 165 Second, comparing the situations in Turkey and Italy foregrounds the sociopolitical reality that the Court serves very different functions in these two countries, ranging from the more technical modernization of the Italian judiciary to the democratization of Turkey. The ECtHR's authority with respect to Turkey is also distinctive because the relevant government agencies have shown little recognition of the Court's rulings in terms of implementing them. Of the approximately 2,400 cases decided against Turkey between 1987 and 2001, of which eighty-seven percent found at least one violation, around 1,700 judgments were not fully implemented as of 2012. 166 This strongly indicates the Court's limited narrow and intermediate authority in Turkey. Yet the fact that so many cases are directed to Strasbourg suggests conversely the emergence of a legal field in which the European Convention and the ECtHR are increasingly accepted among many audiences as a tool for legal and social change even though some government agents continue to resist it.
In the bigger picture of the evolution of the ECtHR, however, Turkey and Italy are both outliers; France is a far more representative case of how the ECtHR generally developed extensive authority in many European countries throughout the 1990s. France fully entered the ECHR only in 1981, and the first judgments against France were not delivered until the mid-1980s. 167 One of the key agents, la Cour de Cassation, the highest French court on civil and criminal matters, originally sought to integrate the ECtHR into its practices. 168 An estimated 700 French decisions explicitly referring to the ECHR were issued between 1987 and 1997, and la Cour de Cassation was initially quick to incorporate the outcomes of cases against France before the ECtHR into its practices. 169 In light of this collaborative mood, the French highest courts were surprised-if not offended-when the ECtHR began to criticize not only certain police and administrative practices in France but also the functioning of 164 French courts. 170 Counterattacking, the Cour de Cassation launched a rebellion against the Court in response to the rulings of the ECtHR on the impartiality of the general advocates of the Cour de Cassation-a similar situation would occur with regard to the Commissaires du gouvernement of the Conseil d'État-and a number of cases on more technical issues related to, for example, standards of interrogation. 171 It was a real rebellion in the sense that the French court deliberately ignored the relevant ECtHR case law and, in some instances, ignored the ECtHR cases that had found France to be in violation of the ECHR. 172 Yet the use of the ECtHR to attack high courts in France simultaneously spurred an interest among lawyers in challenging the particularities of the French justice system as incompatible with the Convention. 173 The ECtHR virtually became an appeals court to the supreme French courts; the number of cases grew steadily and France eventually became one of the three most frequent litigators in Strasbourg. 174 The response from French judges was that the ECtHR simply failed to grasp the complexity of French justice in the Court's pursuit of a superficial and formalist attempt to set uniform European standards. 175 Regardless of rhetoric, there was little doubt that the ECtHR was becoming both a part of domestic legal reality and a force to be reckoned with in the French legal field at large. The French court system was not alone in coming under fire. The politicoadministrative elites also needed to respond to the criticism from Strasbourg, particularly after the 1999 case Selmouni v France, 176 in which France was found guilty of torture. France was only the second member state that had been found guilty of violating this nonderogable right. 177 This judgment cast a shadow beyond the legal field and its technical concerns. Selmouni became front-page news and confirmed that being the cradle of human rights did not automatically also mean being in the avant-garde of human rights. 178 For French administrative and political elites, this controversial judgment, combined with the persistent need for technical reform due to other ECtHR judgments, was a serious challenge. 179 In fact, it required rethinking the French raison d'état [Vol. 79: 141 through the prism of the ECtHR. 180 The bottom line was that the ECtHR could not be regarded simply as an external phenomenon when it was invoked continuously and successfully against French law and legal practice.
Ultimately at stake in France, as well as in many other European countries during the 1990s, was whether to accept a new, much deeper national implementation of the Convention. The impact of the ECtHR was no longer limited to singular cases in Strasbourg; the Court began to transform more broadly the interface of law and politics through an ever-close transnational normative web. 181 Due to the principle of monism of French constitutional law, which automatically incorporates the country's international obligations into domestic legal law, the Convention had in principle been applicable domestically from the state's ratification of the Convention in 1974-although this had little practical importance as individual petition was only accepted in 1981. 182 In most other member states, this domestication of the Convention required a specific legislative act. 183 Throughout the 1990s, a growing number of countries incorporated the Convention by legislative acts. 184 The main reason for this remarkable shift was arguably the general geopolitical zeitgeist, which favored human rights and neoconstitutionalism both nationally and regionally.
With the incorporation of the ECHR into national law, the Convention became embedded 185 in a substantially different way, which implied that national courts could apply the Convention. That domestic courts could apply the Convention almost immediately produced a significant growth in domestic suits that invoked Convention rights and freedoms, which in turn prompted more petitions to be filed with the Court. 186 The package implemented by national institutions was not only the Convention and national cases that were lost in Strasbourg but also the developing acquis Strasbourgeois, that is, the entire case law of the ECtHR to date. Countries with few or hardly any cases through the late 1980s started having a more steady flow of cases to the Court. 187 But above all, there was massive growth in references to the Convention by national lawyers and, to a lesser extent, judges. 188 Institutionally, the ECtHR became a de facto constitutional court for most member states because the Convention-although in most dualist countries only having the status of 180. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, RAISONNER LA RAISON D'ÉTAT : VERS UNE EUROPE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 18 (1989) (arguing that there is a fundamental clash between the objectives of the ECHR and the craving of national sovereignty and difference in the member states).
181. See supra fig. 3 statutory law-effectively governed human rights at a transnational constitutional level. 189 Viewed cumulatively, these trends transformed the undertaking of European human rights, making the Strasbourg system more akin to EU law: directly applicable and with supreme status. 190 This striking development also changed how different constituencies engaged with the Court. The combined effects of the institutionalization of European human rights law in state bureaucracies, academic programs, and the portfolio of lawyers made European human rights an integral part of public and constitutional law across Europe. 191 Consequently, the ECtHR gained extensive authority in the vast majority of European countries and became part of the deep constitutional structure of national legal orders. The only real exceptions to this trend were Turkey and perhaps Italy, which were harbingers of the trouble the ECtHR would face in the following decade.
B. From Protocol No. 11 to Backlash (2000-2014): New Directions for
European Human Rights?
As the new democracies of Eastern Europe were gradually accepted into the Council of Europe during the 1990s and early 2000s, the ECtHR was on a course of increased activity and potential case overload in its role as a de facto constitutional court of European human rights. The effect of new member states on the Court's output in terms of the number of judgments was not registered until approximately 2005. 192 However, the rapidly growing number of applications from new member states, which put the system under stress, was detectable before that. 193 In light of the original Cold War objectives of the Convention, the accession of Russia to the Convention in 1998 was highly symbolic and was seen by many as a strong indication of the system's success despite skepticism among some founding members. 194 Initially, Russia's entrance had no significant impact. Most of the first applications-approximately 2,000 applications until 2001-were rejected as inadmissible, often on technical grounds. 195 Figure 5 indicates in each column the percentage of overall judgments with Russia as respondent and other respondent states that frequently appeared before the Court. It only includes the most regular litigators from Eastern and Western Europe. The percentage of Russian judgments grew steadily over the period, ending at about fifteen percent of the total amount of judgments.
198 Several other new member states, for example Ukraine, also count for a significant percentage of total number of judgments. 199 
Figure 5
Figure 5 further reveals that the vast growth in decided cases cannot be explained simply by the entrance to the ECtHR of new member states with structural human rights problems. In other words, it is wrong to allocate the transformation in the level of output to only the geopolitical transformation and corresponding additions of member states such as Russia; existing members with structural problems-notably Italy and Turkey-also count for substantial percentages of ECtHR judgments. 200 Yet a dramatic change is visible in the growing total number of judgments delivered. product of the growth model implicit in the expansive interpretive approach of the ECtHR developed in the context of a limited caseload discussed above, but now applied in a context of a rapidly expanding caseload in Strasbourg. Protocol No. 11 was an attempt at rationalizing the operation of the Court in light of a growing backlog of cases. The reform fit well with the pattern of previous overhauls of the system: in every reform of the ECHR system since 1950-including all the additional Protocols No. 1 through 14bis from 1952 through 2009 202 -the member states have chosen either to expand the Court's jurisdiction or to introduce various technical changes to enhance its capability and capacity to carry out its function. 203 There were, however, signs that technical rationalization was inadequate to resolve the new problems faced by the Court. For example, Russia had broken rank in initially refusing to join Protocol No. 14 in 2004, which was drafted to reduce the backlog by giving single judges and three-member panels the power to quickly dispose of meritless complaints. 204 Russia's relations with the Court steadily deteriorated from 2004 on; the Duma continuously refused ratification of Protocol No. 14 until 2010. 205 Though the functioning of the Court had long been considered a matter of technical rationalization, the British offensive with the leaked Draft Declaration before the 2012 Brighton Summit further underscored that the power of the ECtHR was no longer beyond political debate. 206 The subsequent Brighton Declaration stands out in comparison with earlier reforms for two reasons: It identified measures for further rationalization of the ECtHR, and it openly raised the political question of the future role of the Court with a series of negative comments on the quality of the judges and their judgments. 207 Subsequent Protocols Numbers 15 and 16 were explicitly designed to rebalance the system in favor of national levels of law and politics, 208 although the actual contents of these Protocols also indicate the Court's empowerment. 209 Although these reforms emphasized reducing the backlog of cases, the reforms also marked the beginning of what could appear as an odd, informal [Vol. 79: 141 alliance between the United Kingdom and Russia. These two countries had in common that they were the most outspoken critics of the Court. This "alliance" was illustrative of growing discontent with the ECtHR that united critiques from governments and civil society facing Eastern and Western Europe's starkly different human rights situations.
The United Kingdom's volte face with regard to the Court is striking. Throughout the 1990s, human rights were embedded into the fabric of British society through New Labour's attempt at making human rights culture the ethos of multicultural Britain. 210 The Human Rights Act of 1998 was thus a crowning moment that transformed the domestic legal status of human rights and started constitutionalizing British human rights law. 211 The British turnaround to become critical of the ECtHR occurred in the aftermath on the War on Terror, when the Court-to Britain's outrage-stopped deportation of some radical Islamists and terrorists. 212 Other more technical cases caused additional political uproar, including Vinters and Others v. United Kingdom, 213 on the possibility of appeals of life sentences, and Hirst (No. II) v. United Kingdom, 214 finding that a blanket ban on voting by British prisoners violated the Convention.
Although Britain had been found to have violated the Convention in numerous comparably technical cases in years past, the political outrage in Vinters and Hirst stemmed from the ECtHR's foray into a deeply polarized political arena. The ECtHR's involvement in the cases was under intense media coverage that portrayed the Court as effectively overruling legitimate democratic British political decisions and the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy. 215 The Hirst case has generated an ongoing tug-of-war between judges in Strasbourg and British officials and politicians. Currently, there is open noncompliance with the Hirst decision and Britain has another twenty-six cases pending before the Committee of Ministers, the CoE body monitoring compliance with judgments. 216 The ECtHR has responded to Britain's pushback with some hesitation in its subsequent jurisprudence. For example, in Scoppola v. Italy, 217 the Court allowed for depriving prisoners of voting rights if there is a legitimate aim and deprivation is not automatic. But this hesitation is not driving all of the Court's decisions. In McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, 218 the Court reasserted that a blanket ban on prisoners' voting rights constituted a violation. The Court's vacillation regarding Hirst is readily apparent: while the ECtHR is seemingly seeking to retreat in Scoppola from an overreach in Hirst, Britain has not budged on Hirst, and it intervened very strongly in Scoppola against Hirst.
This British pushback in the courtroom, the media, and at the political level may be paying off as the ECtHR is now, seemingly, granting the United Kingdom a wider margin of appreciation-that is, it gives more deference to national decisions. 219 As suggested by one ECtHR judge, the new conciliatory approach moves emphasis from substantial individual justice to more abstract procedural justice. 220 If the member state can document that it has conducted a transparent review of the problem and the relevant ECtHR case law, and has involved the relevant actors, the ECtHR will be less likely to overrule the state's decision. 221 Although the Court's retreat has been described as "qualitative, democracy-enhancing" in the member states, 222 in light of the present analysis it would seem more appropriate to assert that the retreat's main purpose is most likely to find a means that is authority-enhancing for the Court in the context of its tense interface with the United Kingdom. Consequently, the rights-oriented jurisprudence that became the Court's trademark in the late 1970s is being supplemented, or replaced, by new forms of strategic judging reminiscent of the legal diplomacy of the early ECtHR.
Compared to the United Kingdom, the situation in Russia is completely different. On one hand, Russia exemplifies the problem of structural human rights violations that are also visible in a number of other new member states. There are endemic and unsolved problems with due process, police brutality, prison conditions, and freedom of the press, as well as other rights. 223 As of 2014, Russia has been the subject of 1,604 cases, and the Court found a violation in all [Vol. 79: 141 but seventy-four. 224 Comparatively, in the same period, Ukraine appeared in 1,002 cases and only in ten were violations not found. Poland appeared in 1,070 cases and nonviolation was found in 107 of them. 225 Resembling the situation of Italy and Turkey, the rulings of the ECtHR with regard to a number of new member states seem not to solve the human rights problems at hand but instead highlight them and spur mobilization toward the Court, which engenders further backlog and political tensions.
Yet Russia is an exceptional case. The fact that the country has been involved in numerous violent military disputes over territory has raised unprecedented issues relating to interstate conflict-earlier interstate complaints in the Cyprus, Greece, Northern Ireland, and Turkey cases never involved interstate war among member states. 226 The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 prompted not only an interstate complaint but also many individual applications. 227 Likewise, the Chechen-Russian conflict produced numerous individual applications. 228 Most recently, the Russo-Ukrainian warfare has trigged an interstate complaint. 229 The Strasbourg system was never set up with such situations in mind. 230 Though the Court overcame significant challenges as an instrument of democratization-witnessed in numerous cases from Eastern Europe and earlier, in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 231 it has been an ineffective tool for promoting democracy in warlike conditions. 232 As a result of Russia's contentious relationship with the Court, it is the odd man out. For example, although Russia has an accredited delegation in Strasbourg, its right to vote and to be represented in the Parliamentary Assembly's main bodies has been suspended. 233 Further, Russia has both been threatened with expulsion and has threatened to leave the CoE multiple times since 2000. 234 These examples of pushback from the United Kingdom and Russia are not the only signs of increasing challenges to the ECtHR's authority. As recent reports from the Committee of Ministers have shown, compliance rates are declining, and most countries are now subject to compliance monitoring. 235 kind of compliance. Where the state response is typically limited to paying damages without further implementation of judgments-in Russia, for instance-this challenges narrow authority. 241 Where the states are seeking a dialogue and have demonstrated willingness to reform-Poland, for examplethis is not necessarily detrimental to narrow authority. 242 It is clear that the Court's narrow authority varies even among member states with structural problems. Although the Court has little narrow authority in Russia, the reverse situation exists for the Court in Poland and many other new member states engaging with the Court and Committee of Ministers to find solutions to structural problems.
In addition to member states' consequential steps toward giving full effect to the Court's rulings, the other closely related criteria for assessing the ECtHR's authority suggested by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen is recognition by constituencies. 243 Member states' rhetoric, increasingly critical of the Court, is salient in this regard. Although this discourse of discontent is rooted in very different legal and political circumstances from one country to another, these differences seem lost on many commentators. In fact, one can observe a diffusion of critical discourse: critics from countries with comparatively few cases in Strasbourg-such as Denmark and Finland-adopt the very same discursive means as states facing more serious challenges from Strasbourg. 244 In the legal field, highly critical voices speak out in every single European state. Even presidents of national supreme courts are openly voicing their opposition to the ECtHR-most recently, the Supreme Court Presidents from the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Finland. 245 Although bashing the ECtHR is not new, the generalization of the discourse across Europe and its application to very different human rights situations is quite novel. The United Kingdom's current government does stand out, however, even from previous U.K. governments with its threat of leaving the ECHR; Russia is in part already ousted from the CoE. Most other member states, however, are not seeking such radical breaks with Strasbourg.
Compared to the discourse of discontent, the Brighton Declaration, adopted by consensus, provides a different but more robust empirical indicator of the general recognition of the ECtHR by key constituencies-the member states' governments. 246 Importantly, at no point does the Declaration suggest reducing Convention rights or the acquis of Strasbourg. 247 Although the Brighton Declaration is not limiting the Court's subject-matter authority, it is nevertheless seeking to limit its future role in defining that authority by giving more power to national institutions. 248 Nothing is fixed at the moment, and much probably depends on the Court's ability to reduce the backlog of cases and implement reforms. 249 The Declaration mainly seeks a different balance between the Court and the member states. But this unsolved balance between national and European human rights law creates a new uncertainty in the system where the Court seems to be seeking the approval of the constituencies. This rebalancing of the system-between law and politics and between the international and the national-might best be understood as an indicator of new fragility in the system. 250 This fragility is apparent in the described efforts by the United Kingdom and Russia to reduce the ECtHR's power over domestic matters. The very recent case law giving more leeway to member states is probably the first empirical indication of this decline of power of the ECtHR. But as suggested by Alter, Helfer and Madsen, power and authority are to be treated as two distinct phenomena. Following Alter, Helfer and Madsen's framework, the Court's power is currently challenged, but its overall authority is generally sustained, at least for the time being.
IV CONCLUSION
Not long ago, the ECtHR was heralded as "one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of international law, perhaps in the history of all law." 251 Since the Brighton Declaration, Europeans have become accustomed to a different kind of discourse where both the judgments and the judges are scolded by fuming heads of states, members of the press, and senior members of the legal profession. As suggested, however, this new critical discourse is not necessarily a sign of shrinking ECtHR authority. Underneath this discourse lies an uneven human rights landscape with some member states facing very different challenges-qualitatively and quantitatively-in giving effect to the European Convention. 252 forty-seven member states, it is clear from the case studies examined here that the most serious challenges to the Court's authority are concentrated in some member states, notably the United Kingdom and Russia.
The United Kingdom and Russia, although having fueled broader public discontent with the Court, might be outliers in the bigger picture, however. Despite these member states' fundamentally different human rights situations, they both move away from European consensus on human rights and the European integration project more generally. The United Kingdom's projects, on one hand, have recently included threats of leaving the Convention and even the EU. And Russia, on the other hand, is pursuing the rise of the BRICs as an alternative way of restoring its power and threatening its flight from the CoE.
These broader changes in the behavior of two important member states cannot be explained simply as a response to the quality of the rulings or the judges of the ECtHR. Instead, the change in behavior is a reflection of the transformation in the broader geopolitical contexts in which both the member states and the Court operates. The post-Cold War period catalyzed the Court's rapid growth and an ideological demand for its services to democratize Eastern Europe. The current geopolitical situation has different demands. Although the "post-post Cold War" era has competing origins-the rise of China, 9/11 and the fight against terrorism, the financial crisis and resulting crisis in the European project and economy, et cetera-the era has resulted in new cleavages in Europe, including in the area of human rights. Specifically, there are indications, notably regarding to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, that the boundary of Europe is being redrawn both geographically and symbolically. At the same time the United Kingdom is championing a different balance between national and European law and politics of human rights. There is nothing new in the fact that geopolitics prompts change in the delineation of liberal Europe and its commitment to human rights. On the contrary, as suggested by this analysis of the long-term evolution of the ECtHR, geopolitical transformations have consistently impacted the operation of the Court: Cold War, decolonization, détente, and the post-Cold War. The current geopolitical transformation will also-if it has not already-impact the authority of the ECtHR. What is uncertain, however, is the precise direction of that change. What we can observe right now is form of boundary politics of the space regulated by the ECHR both with regard to its geographical reach and its impact on the national level of law and politics. The question remains what impact that will have on the authority of the Court in the long run.
consistly under the common threshold, while others face very few problems).
